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a b s t r a c t
We develop a mathematical model to quantitatively analyze a scalable region-based
hierarchical group key management protocol integrated with intrusion detection to deal
with both outsider and insider security attacks for group communication systems (GCSs)
inmobileadhocnetworks(MANETs).Ourproposedadaptiveintrusiondetectiontechnique
is based on majority voting by nodes in a geographical region to cope with collusion
of compromised nodes, with each node preloaded with anomaly-based or misuse-based
intrusion detection techniques to diagnose compromised nodes in the same region. When
given a set of parameter values characterizing operational and environmental conditions,
we identify the optimal intrusion detection rate and the optimal regional area size under
which the mean time to security failure of the system is maximized and/or the total
communication cost is minimized for GCSs in MANET environments. The tradeoff analysis
in performance versus security is useful in identifying and dynamically applying optimal
settings to maximize the system lifetime for scalable mobile group applications while
satisfying application-specific performance requirements.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Many mobile applications in wireless networks such as military battlefields, emergency response, mobile commerce,
online gaming, and collaborative work are based on the notion of group communications. Designing security protocols
for secure group communication systems (GCSs) in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) faces many technical challenges
including resource-constrained environments (e.g., bandwidth, memory size, battery life, and computational power),
openness to eavesdropping and security threats, unreliable communication, no infrastructure support, and rapid changes in
network topology due to user mobility which could cause group merge/partition events to occur dynamically [1].
In this paper, we are concerned with dynamic GCSs in MANETs where mobile nodes cooperate in a group setting to
accomplish assigned mission tasks as in military battlefield situations. A GCS initially may contain one mobile group. Later
a mobile group may be split into two because of node mobility and failure. Two mobile groups may merge into one when
connectivity is resumed. Our notion of a mobile group is connectivity-oriented, i.e., nodes are in a mobile group as long as
they are connected.
TheGCSismission-orientedinthatallmobilegroupsregardlessoftheirsizewillexecutetheassignedmissionthroughout
their lifetime. Thus, the primary goal of a mission-oriented GCS is to prolong its system lifetime in the presence of
security attacks to increase the success probability of mission execution. The secondary goal is to satisfy application-specific
performancerequirementsintermsoftimeliness,throughput,delay,ortrafficcapacity.Thispaperaimstosolvetheproblem
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Fig. 1. Integration of region-based group key management for dealing with outsider attacks with intrusion detection for dealing with insider attacks for
a GCS in MANETs.
of prolonging the system lifetime of such a GCS in the presence of security attacks while satisfying system performance
requirements.
To deal with outsider attacks, a cost-effective way is to use a symmetric key, called the group key, shared by group
members. The group key is employed to encrypt messages sent by a member to the group. Only members of the group
with the group key are capable of decrypting the messages. Thus, the group key protects group communication information
shared by legitimate members. Since there is no infrastructure support in MANETs, key management must be performed
in a fully distributed manner. This creates extra system overheads whenever the group key is ‘‘rekeyed’’ because of a group
memberleave/join/evictionevent.Forscalabilityandperformancereasons,weadvocatetheuseofregion-basedhierarchical
group key management [2] for generating and distributing the group key.
To deal with insider attacks, intrusion detection system (IDS) techniques [3] have been proposed. IDS can be employed
to detect compromised nodes and to evict such compromised nodes with the goal of high survivability and availability to
prolong the system lifetime. In MANETs, distributed IDS must be employed because it is not practical to use a centralized
IDS server which would be a single point of failure. We advocate the use of voting-based IDS [4] to cope with collusion of
compromised nodes for survivability.
In the literature, group key management and IDS techniques for MANETs have been studied separately to deal with
outside attackers and inside attackers, respectively. However, both are needed in a GCS to ensure high system survivability
and security. As a result, group key management and IDS are often deployed separately, resulting in high management
overhead and degraded performance. In this paper, we aim to demonstrate the advantages of integrated management over
separate management. Specifically, we propose to integrate region-based hierarchical group key management [2] with a
new region-voting-based IDS scheme to result in a highly survivable and efficient GCS. We use the mean time to security
failure (MTTSF) as the security metric to measure the lifetime of a GCS system under security attacks. We use the control
message traffic generated for secure group communication as the performance metric. We analyze the tradeoff of security
versus performance properties of a GCS system by means of a mathematical model and identify optimal settings such that
the system MTTSF is maximized while the total control message traffic incurred is minimized in the GCS. Fig. 1 shows the
structure of our integrated protocol to deal with both outsider and insider attacks while satisfying security and performance
requirements for GCSs in MANETs. We shall demonstrate that integrated management yields higher MTTSF while producing
lower control message traffic compared with separate deployment of key management and IDS techniques in the literature.
The contributions of the paper are as follows. First, we consider an integrated design to cope with both outsider and
insider security attacks, i.e., region-based group key management for dealing with outsider attacks and region-voting-
based IDS for dealing with insider attacks, with the goal to achieve secure GCSs in MANETs. This is the first work that
investigates the interplay between group key management and IDS and analyzes their interwoven effect of how one affects
the optimal setting of the other for maximizing the mean lifetime of the system. Second, we analyze the tradeoff of security
versus performance properties of GCSs as a result of integrating IDS with hierarchical group key management for scalability,
survivability, and efficiency. Third, we introduce region-voting-based IDS to cope with collusion of compromised nodes
to prolong the system MTTSF with a randomness design in the vote-participants and region-leader selection process to
mitigate the problem of a single point of attack/failure. Lastly, we develop a mathematical model based on stochastic Petri
nets(SPN)[5]toquantitativelyidentifyoptimalsettingsintermsoftheoptimalregionalareasizeandtheintrusiondetection
interval that would maximize the system lifetime (in terms of MTTSF) while satisfying performance requirements (i.e., total
communication cost per time unit). The SPN model developed is capable of dealing with a large number of states and the
underlyingsemi-Markovchaingeneratedcanaccommodateanygeneraltimedistributionformodelingtheeventoccurrence
duration, thus allowing periodic events and non-exponential-time events to be easily analyzed. A GCS can monitor the
operational and environmental conditions characterized by a set of model parameter values at runtime and apply the
optimal settings identified in this paper at static time by means of a table look-up operation so as to dynamically maximize
the system MTTSF and satisfy imposed performance requirements.Author's personal copy
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Table 1
New contributions to region-based hierarchical group key management.
Region-based group key management [2] This work
Insider attacks No Yes
Outsider attacks Yes Yes
Optimization design tradeoffs Performance tradeoff Performance versus security tradeoffs
Optimal settings Optimal regional area size Optimal regional area size and optimal
intrusion detection interval
Metrics Overall communication cost Overall communication cost, MTTSF
Integration of group key management with IDS No Yes
Events considered Join, leave, group merge, group partition,
mobility, and beaconing
Join, leave, group merge, group partition,
mobility, beaconing, group communication,
intrusion detection, and node eviction
As this paper integrates region-based hierarchical group key management [2] with region-voting-based IDS to deal with
both outsider and insider attacks, we summarize this paper’s new contributions with respect to our prior work in region-
based hierarchical group key management in Table 1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related work in dealing with insider and outsider attacks
for secure GCSs in MANETs. Section 3 describes our proposed integrated hierarchical group key management and region-
voting-based IDS protocol. Section 4 describes the system model covering the assumptions used, security failure conditions
defined, performance and security metrics used, and attack model. Section 5 develops a mathematical model based on SPN
and explains how we model group merge/partition events and how we calculate security and performance metrics from the
mathematical model developed. Section 6 shows analytical results obtained with physical interpretations given. Section 7
discusses the applicability of the proposed integrated protocol and summarizes the paper with future work outlined.
2. Related work
Several hierarchical group key management protocols have been proposed in the literature for scalability reasons.
IGKMP[7,6]dividesagroupintoseveralsubgroupstoenhancescalabilityandappliesseveralrekeyingalgorithmstopreserve
secrecy properties as members move within the hierarchy. However, it is not suitable for MANETs where nodes are mobile
and wireless communication is often unreliable. Rafaeli et al. [8] proposed Hydra, Dondeti et al. [9] proposed DEP, and
Mittra et al. [10] proposed Iolus for secure multicasting communication. However, all are based on the use of static subgroup
controllers in the system and are also not suitable for MANETs. In [11], HKT was proposed to balance security and efficiency,
making use of a two-level hybrid key tree based on clusters. Cluster sizes are adjusted depending on the level of collusion
resistance. However, HKT is designed for wired networks. Hierarchical group key management protocols developed for
MANETs include [12–19]. Rhee et al. [18] employed a two-layer hierarchical key management structure for secure group
communications for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). They considered the use of a stationary super-node as a cluster
head. Bechler et al. [15] proposed an efficient distributed key management based on hierarchical clustering. However, no
optimal setting was identified to maximize system performance. Lazos et al. [16] considered a hierarchical key management
structure for energy-aware secure multicast group communication in MANETs based on geographic routing. They assumed
a fixed cluster size without identifying the optimal cluster size to maximize system performance. Furthermore, they only
consideredgroupjoin/leaveeventswithoutconsideringgrouppartition/mergeeventsduetonodemobility.In[12,13,17,20],
the optimal cluster or group size to minimize rekeying cost was studied. The analysis, however, is not for mission-oriented
GCSs in MANETs.
Very recently, we investigated a region-based group key management protocol [2] to improve the system performance
for group key generation and distribution for GCSs in MANETs. Their protocol breaks the operational area into regions to
reduce the group key management overhead and to make the protocol scalable to a large number of nodes in a group. An
optimal regional area size was identified based on the tradeoff between inter-regional and intra-regional communication
cost.However,itdealswithoutsiderattacksonlywiththefocusoncommunicationcostminimization.Thispaperextends[2]
by integrating the hierarchical group key management protocol with region-voting-based IDS in order to deal with both
insider and outsider attacks, with the goal to achieve not only high scalability and efficiency, but also high survivability for
GCSs in MANETs.
Recent research efforts on IDS protocols developed for MANETs focus on cluster-based IDS for scalability. A major issue
is that the cluster head is a single point of failure. The main idea behind cluster-based IDS is that instead of performing
host-based IDS at each node, a cluster head (CH) is selected to collect security-related information from nodes in a cluster
and determines if intrusion has occurred. Non-overlapping zone-based IDS was proposed in [21,22] for MANETs and proven
to be effective in intrusion detection. Marti et al. [23] developed a watchdog mechanism for identifying misbehaving nodes
based on dynamic behaviors and developed a pathrater algorithm for routing around misbehaving nodes for MANETs. Debar
et al. [24] suggested aggregation and correlation of IDS alerts to reduce communication/computational overhead caused by
performing IDS. Hierarchical IDS was proposed in [25–27] to realize distributed anomaly-based IDS in MANETs. However,
the issues of extra latency and energy consumption are not addressed. The assumptions that the CH is tamper-resistant andAuthor's personal copy
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the CH selection process will not be interrupted by attackers are also questionable. We advocate region-voting-based IDS
by which multiple nodes in a region participate in the eviction process of a target node and perform a distributed majority
voting to determine if the target node is to be evicted. This eliminates a single point of failure in cluster-based IDS protocols.
Little work addresses both security and performance issues of IDS. Stern et al. [28] proposed data reduction techniques
to reduce the communication cost in their IDS design. Subhadrabandhu et al. [29–31] studied the tradeoff between energy,
computational, and communication resource consumption versus IDS accuracy based on distributed IDS. Our work also
concerns the effect of IDS on security and performance properties of the system since we aim to determine the best IDS
operational settings to prolong the system lifetime against security attacks while satisfying the performance requirement.
However, ourwork differs from theseprior works inthat we integrate region-voting-IDS with hierarchical keymanagement
to deal with both insider and outsider attacks and our integrated protocol specifically deals with secure GCSs in MANET
environments.
Our work has its root in model-based quantitative analysis [32]. In the literature, not much work has been done in
extendingmodel-basedquantitativeanalysistosecurityanalysis.Zhangetal.[6]analyzedseveralgrouprekeyingalgorithms
in wireless environments and evaluated their performance characteristics. Dacier et al. [33] proposed a system model using
a privilege graph demonstrating operational security vulnerabilities and transformed the privilege graph into a Markov
chain based on all possible successful attack scenarios. Jonsson et al. [34] presented a quantitative Markov model of attacker
behaviors by proposing multiple phases, such as learning, standard attack, and innovative attack. Popstojanova et al. [35]
presented a state transition model to describe dynamic behaviors of intrusion tolerance systems including a framework
defining the vulnerability and the threat set. Madan et al. [36,37] employed a Semi-Markov Process (SMP) model to evaluate
security attributes of an intrusion-tolerant system. A steady-state analysis has been used to obtain dependability measures
such as availability. A transient analysis with absorbing states has been used to obtain security measures such as MTTSF
similar to the computation of the mean time to failure (MTTF) in reliability analysis. Stevens et al. [38] also proposed a
networked intrusion tolerant information system using a model-based validation technique, the so called probabilistic
modeling. They used two security metrics: the mean time to discovery (MTTD) refers to the mean time between successive
discoveries of unknown vulnerabilities and the mean time to exploit (MTTE) refers to the mean time between successive
exploitationsofaknownvulnerability.Wangetal.[39]utilizedahigher-levelformalismbasedonSPN forsecurityanalysisof
intrusion tolerant systems. Recently, Leversage and James [40] suggested a security metric to intelligently compare systems
and to make corporate security decisions. They proposed a mean time-to-compromise (MTTC) metric to measure the time
neededforanattackertosuccessfullydisruptatargetsystem.Mostpreviousworkscitedabove,however,oftenonlyfocused
on security measures without considering the impact of deploying security protocols on the performance of the system.
In this paper, we develop model-based analysis techniques that consider both security and performance aspects with the
objective to identify operational settings under which both security and performance requirements can be best satisfied.
Tothebestofourknowledge,noexistingworkconsiderstheintegrationofgroupkeymanagement(todealwithoutsider
attacks) with intrusion detection mechanisms (to deal with insider attacks) for high scalable, reconfigurable, and survivable
GCSs in MANETs. Our work is the first that considers these two mechanisms and their interplay with analysis techniques
beingdevelopedtodeterminethebestsettingtoexecutetheintegratedprotocoltosatisfyboththesecurityandperformance
requirements for GCSs in MANETs.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. IDS protocol
To effectively integrate IDS with region-based hierarchical group key management and investigate their interplay, we
develop a new region-voting-based IDS protocol borrowing the concepts of distributed revocation based on majority voting
in sensor networks [41] and voting-based IDS design in MANETs [4]. The protocol requires each node to preinstall host-
based IDS to evaluate its neighbors based on evidences collected, mostly route-related and traffic-related information [26].
Route-related information may include node velocity, new and stale routes, routes added by overhearing, repaired routes,
route changes, and the average route length. Traffic-related information may include packet type (e.g., data, route request,
route reply), flow direction (e.g., received, sent, forwarded, dropped), sampling interval, and statistics measures (e.g., the
count and standard deviation of inter-packet intervals) [26,42]. Anomalies of route-related and traffic-related information
can show evidence of malicious attacks. Each node can also actively collect information such as observing if a packet sent
to a neighbor is not forwarded as requested. For example, in the MAC layer, it may include the total number of channel
requests, the total number of nodes making channel requests, and the largest, the mean, and the smallest of all requests.
In the application layer, it may include the total number of requests made to a service, the number of different services
requested, the average duration of a service, the number of nodes that have requested any service, and the total number of
service errors.
The host-based IDS preinstalled in each node can be characterized by two parameters, namely, the per-node false
negative probability (p1) and per-node false positive probability (p2). The host-based IDS can use any general IDS technique
characterizedbyp1andp2suchasmisusedetection(alsocalledsignature-baseddetection)oranomalydetection[29].Under
region-voting-based IDS, compromised nodes are detected based on majority voting. Periodically, a target node would beAuthor's personal copy
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evaluatedbymvote-participantsdynamicallyandrandomlyselectedoutofgroupmembersinthesamegeographicalregion
(see Section 3.2 below for the meaning of a ‘‘region’’ under region-based hierarchical group key management).
Our proposed region-voting-based IDS protocol performs its detection and eviction function periodically. In a detection
interval, each node would be evaluated by m vote-participants where m is a system parameter whose effect will be analyzed
in the paper. All nodes are loosely synchronized and votes are tallied only during the current detection time interval. The
m vote-participants are randomly selected from members within the same region as follows. Since members within the
same region know each other’s id and location, each node will utilize a preinstalled hash function R(x) that takes in the
id + location of the target node concatenated with the id + location of every other node as the hash key. The m nodes
that yield the highest hash values will be selected as the m vote-participants voting for or against the target node. The
main benefit of using a randomization function to determine m vote-participants is that it does require any communication
between nodes. Because there is no vote-coordinator, it avoids a single point of attack/failure. Each vote-participant node
selected will independently vote for or against the target node by disseminating its vote to all other regional members. Vote
authenticityisachievedviapreloadedpublickeysofallothergroupmembers.Bythisway,allregionalmembersknowwhom
vote-participants are, and, based on votes received, can determine whether or not a target node is considered compromised
and needs to be evicted for security reasons.
Since each node has a unique id, all group members know which target node is being evaluated. If the majority decided to
voteagainstthetargetnode,thenthetargetnodewouldbeevictedfromthesystem.Thisaddsintrusiontolerancetotolerate
collusion of compromised nodes in MANETs. We characterize region-voting-based IDS by two parameters, namely, false
negative probability (Pfn) and false positive probability (Pfp). Later we will derive a formula to assess these two parameters
based on (a) the per-node false negative and positive probabilities (p1 and p2); (b) the number of vote-participants, m,
selected to vote for or against a target node; and (c) an estimate of the current number of compromised nodes which may
colludewiththeobjectivetodisrupttheserviceofthesystem.Sincemnodesareselectedtovote,ifthemajorityofmvoting-
participants (i.e., >⌈m/2⌉) casts negative votes against a target node, the target node is considered compromised and will
be evicted from the system. Here p1 and p2 are probabilities for characterizing how often a good node will make a false
alarm. When a good node evaluates a bad node, it will fail to identify it as a bad node with probably p1; when a good node
evaluates another good node, it will misdiagnose it as a bad node with probability p2. A false alarm from one good node
is not harmful as long as there are more than ⌈m/2⌉ other good nodes correctly evaluating the target node in the voting
process. In the special case in which there is only a single region, all nodes in the group are candidates as vote-participants
against a target node. The selection of m vote-participants from member nodes from a geographical region of different sizes
affects the security and performance aspects of region-voting-based IDS for which we aim to study its effect in this paper.
3.2. Region-based group key management protocol
In this paper, we extend region-based group key management [2] to include intrusion detection events to tolerate
insider attacks. The region-based group key management scheme divides a group into region-based subgroups based on
decentralized key management principles. This protocol requires each group member to be equipped with GPS to know
its location as it moves across regions. When a member crosses a regional boundary, it changes its subgroup ‘‘regional’’
membership although it is still a member of the group. For secure group communications [43], all group members share a
secret group key, KG. All subgroup members in region i share a secret regional key, KRi. In addition, each region has a leader
and all leaders in the system share a leader secret key (KRL) for efficiency purposes. In summary, there are three keys for
hierarchicalgroupkeymanagement:leaderkey(KRL),regionalkey(KR),andgroupkey(KG).Thesekeysarerekeyedproperly,in
part or in whole, as events happen in the system, including group join/leave/eviction, node failure, regional boundary cross,
and group merge/partition. In this paper, we consider additional events associated with IDS activities, including intrusion
detection timer events and eviction events. In addition to maintain secrecy, our region-based key management scheme also
maintains membership consistency through three membership views: (a) Regional View (RV) contains regional membership
information including regional (or subgroup) members’ ids and their location information, (b) Leader View (LV) contains
leaders’ ids and their location information, and (c) Group View (GV) contains group membership information that includes
members’ ids and their location information [2,44].
For robustness and distributed control, a contributory key agreement (CKA) protocol based on Group Diffie–Hellman
(GDH) [45] is used to generate and manage a shared secret key. In particular, we use GDH.3 (the optimized version of
GDH) allowing the use of fixed-sized messages and only a constant number of exponentiation operations executed by each
participant.Withthesefeatures,GDH.3hasbeenproposedtobeusedforrekeyingbymobiledeviceswithlowcomputational
capabilities [45]. If an inside attacker interrupts the rekeying process, then a timeout event will be triggered to restart the
rekeyingprocess.Asmartinsideattacker,however,maydecidetoallowtherekeyingoperationtobeexecutedtocompletion
so that it can learn of the new secret group key with which to obtain secret group information and cause the system to fail.
If it continues to interrupt rekeying, it may eventually be caught by IDS and evicted from the system before it causes the
system to fail.
A regional leader will be selected randomly among regional members so that the adversary will not have a specific target
to launch their attacks. We add randomness to the leader selection process by introducing another hashing function H(x)
that takes in the id of a node concatenated with the current location of the node as the hash key. The node with the smallestAuthor's personal copy
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returned hash value would then become the regional leader. Since regional members know each other’s id and location,
they can independently execute the hash function to determine which node should be the leader.
Below we briefly describe how the extended region-based group key management protocol handles group partition,
group merge, node eviction, group communication, and intrusion detection events. Standard mobile group events such as
member join, member leave and mobility induced operations are described in [2] and will not be repeated here.
Grouppartition:Groupmembersmayloseconnectionwitheachotherduetonodefailureornodemobility.Thus,agroup
may be partitioned into multiple groups dynamically. In general, group partition increases as the node density decreases
and as the node mobility increases. A group partition event starts with a region being partitioned and detected by members
in the region missing the leader’s beacon message, and by the leader missing its regional members’ beaconing messages.
In the former case, a new leader may be elected following a leader election protocol. In the latter case, the leader with the
remaining nodes in the partitioned region will execute GDH to agree on a new regional key KR. In any case, all leaders in
each partitioned group will execute GDH to agree on a new leader key KRL.
Groupmerge:Twogroupsmaymergeintoonewhenconnectivityresumes.Agroupmergeeventisdetectedbymembers
within a region detecting the presence of non-group members by listening to beacon messages issued from nodes with a
different group ID. After authentication a new regional leader in a merged region is selected following the leader selection
protocol. Then members in the merged region will execute GDH to agree on a new regional key KR following the ‘‘group
member join’’ protocol as if members in the merged region had just newly joined the group. The new leader in the merged
region then coordinates with all other leaders to execute GDH to agree on a new leader key KRL. Finally, a new group key KG
is generated by all leaders and is distributed to all group members in the merged group.
Eviction: After a node is detected as compromised, the group key KG is rekeyed based on GDH to evict the compromised
node.
Group communication: Each node may communicate with other nodes in the group to request data. We assume that
the time interval is exponentially distributed with rate λq. A node may disseminate a message to its group members by
sending the message to its leader using KR; the leader would then forward the message to other leaders using KRL; finally,
each leader will disseminate the message to all its regional members using KR based on multicasting.
Intrusion detection: Messages required for IDS activities follow the rules for group communication, including status
exchange,vote-participantselection,vote-participant-listdissemination,andvotedissemination.Atargetnodeisexamined
by IDS periodically and if the target node is considered compromised, it will be evicted by rekeying the group key KG based
on GDH.
4. System model
WeassumethattheGCSisinMANETsinwhichthereisnocentralizedkeyservertoauthenticateandauthorizeindividual
group members. Each node is preloaded with the public keys of all other group members for authentication purposes. For
efficiency reasons, a group key is used for group communications by group members. The group key is rekeyed by running
a contributory key agreement (CKA) protocol such as GDH, as there is no centralized trust entity to generate and disseminate
the group key. The group members of the proposed GCS in MANETs are assumed to be spread over a geographical area
A = πr2 with r being the radius.
The workload and operational conditions of a GCS in MANETs can be characterized by a set of model parameters. Assume
that a node may leave a group voluntarily with rate µ and may rejoin any group with rate λ due to tactical reasons. Then,
the probability that a node is in any group is λ/(λ + µ) and the probability that it is not in any group is µ/(λ + µ). Nodes
can move freely with a mobility rate of σ. A group is connectivity-oriented, that is, nodes that are connected with each
other form a group. When all nodes are connected, there is only a single group in the system. Due to node mobility, a group
may be partitioned into two. Conversely, two groups may merge into one as connectivity resumes. We assume that the
secure GCS is designed to support a mission critical application. All nodes are charged to complete a mission and the mission
critical application allows group merging and partitioning activities in response to network dynamics. However, a group,
no matter what its size, acts independently of other groups with the intent to continue with mission execution. Nodes in a
group must satisfy the forward/backward secrecy, confidentiality, integrity, and authentication requirements for secure group
communications in the presence of outsider and insider attacks. Reliable transmission is a system requirement for secure
group communications. We assume that view synchrony (VS) is guaranteed in GCSs [2], which guarantees that messages are
deliveredreliablyandintheproperorderunderthesamemembershipview.Thatis,areceiverwillseethesamemembership
view as viewed by the sender. While maintaining view synchrony introduces many control messages, it will only affect the
communication cost incurred, but not MTTSF because it won’t cause a security failure condition to be satisfied.
Weuseahexagonalcoveragemodel[2]tocovertheoperationalarea.Whiletherearemanywaystodividetheoperational
area into multiple regions, we choose the hexagonal model for analytical solution conveniences. The solution methodology
canbeappliedtoothermodelssuchasmeshnetworkswithoutlossofgenerality.TheoperationalgeographicalareaA = πr2
is divided into R(n) = 3n2 + 3n + 1 regions such that there are 61 regions with n = 4, 37 regions with n = 3, 19 regions
with n = 2, 7 regions with n = 1, and 1 region with n = 0, where n is the ring level. The probability that a member moves
across a boundary between two regions, denoted by PRM(n), is given by:
PRM(n) =
6(3n2 + 3n + 1) − (12n + 6)
6(3n2 + 3n + 1)
. (1)Author's personal copy
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It can be shown that the regional mobility rate σn is given by:
σn = (2n + 1)nPRM(n). (2)
For attacker behaviors, we assume the presence of smart inside attackers who will attempt to compromise nodes with
a variable rate depending on the number of compromised nodes in the system. Based on the principles given in [41], we
assume that the attacker strength increases proportional to the number of compromised nodes in the system because of the
collusion of compromised nodes. To dynamically react to the attacker strength, we also adaptively increase the intrusion
detection rate proportional to the number of compromised nodes detected to counteract intrusion.
To alleviate collusion, the system performs region-voting-based IDS by which a majority of m vote-participants must
agree in order to evict a suspicious target node, where m is the number of vote-participants randomly selected from group
members in the same region of the target node. Whether one should select vote-participants from a larger or smaller region
depends on the security and performance requirements of the GCS. The special case in which there is no region is used as a
baseline model against which region-voting-based IDS is compared. In general, region-voting-based IDS is characterized by
its false negative probability (Pfn) and false positive probability (Pfp) which depend on p1 and p2 in host-based IDS and the
number of compromised nodes in the system.
4.1. Security failure conditions
We assume that the GCS enters a security failure state when any mobile group fails. A mobile group fails when one of the
two conditions below is true:
Condition C1: a compromised but undetected member requests and subsequently obtains ‘‘secret’’ data using the group
key, representing a loss of integrity [46] security failure.
Condition C2: more than 1/3 of member nodes in a group are compromised but not detected by IDS, representing a loss
of availability [46] security failure. This follows the Byzantine Failure model [47] such that when more than 1/3 of member
nodes are compromised, the system fails.
The first condition represents that important data are compromised. The second condition represents that the mobile
group is unable to function correctly and is compromised as a whole. Both conditions lead to security failure.
4.2. Metrics
We use the following two metrics to measure security and performance properties of a GCS in MANETs:
MTTSF (Mean Time to Security Failure): This metric indicates the lifetime of the GCS before it reaches a security failure
state. For a secure GCS, a security failure occurs when either Condition C1 or Condition C2 is true. As a security metric, lower
MTTSF means a faster loss of system integrity or loss of availability. Therefore, a design goal is to maximize MTTSF.
Communication cost(ˆ Ctotal): This metric indicates total control message traffic incurred per time unit (s) including
groupcommunication,statusexchange,rekeying,intrusiondetection,beacon,grouppartition/merge,andmobility-induced
activities. A high ˆ Ctotal translates into a high level of contention over the wireless channel and consequently a high response
time for group communication operations. A design goal is to minimize the average ˆ Ctotal by exploring the tradeoff between
inter-regional and intra-regional communication costs. The computational cost is not included in ˆ Ctotal.
4.3. Attack model
We integrate region-based group key management with region-voting-based IDS to deal with both outsider and
insider attacks. In general, an outside attacker would attempt to gain authorized access and then perpetrate as an inside
attacker. Below we discuss possible outsider attack scenarios [48] and our countermeasures. An outside attacker can gain
unauthorized access to a legitimate account by eavesdropping data packets or any message containing a secret key for more
sophisticatedattacks.Weuseindividualrekeying[49]atthreedifferentlevels(i.e.,regionalkey,leaderkey,andgroupkey)to
prevent loss of confidentiality. An outside attacker can also attempt to modify a data packet to break data integrity. We use a
symmetrickey(thegroupkey)sharedbyonlylegitimategroupmemberstopreventlossofdataintegrity.Anoutsideattacker
mayimpersonateagroupmembertojoinagroup.Wehaveeachnodepreloadedwithpublickeysofallothergroupmembers
to ensure source authenticity and to prevent potential impersonation attacks during the authentication process of a new
group member’s join. Active outsider attacks such as denial of service (DoS) attacks can also be eased by authentication. An
outside attacker may forge packets. Since only legitimate group members with a secret key distributed can understand data
packets communicated by other group members, forged packets will be discarded. An outsider can also perform jamming
attacks. The standard defense against jamming includes spread spectrum or frequency hopping communication, locating
the jamming area and rerouting traffic.
Insider attackers are compromised nodes disguising themselves as legitimate healthy members to disrupt the system. We
discuss insider attack scenarios and our countermeasures below. An adversary can collude with other compromised nodes
so as to more efficiently compromise another node and eventually cause the system to fail. For example, in the process
of region-voting-based intrusion detection, an adversary can cast a negative vote against a trusted healthy node or cast aAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 2. SPN performance model.
positive vote for a compromised node. An inside attacker aims to obtain secret group information by communicating with
other group members with a legitimate group key. Thus, a smart inside attacker may not wish to interrupt the rekeying
process so that it can learn of the new group key with which to obtain secret group information. When this happens,
a security failure due to Condition C1 occurs. This is countered by invoking IDS at the optimal rate identified by our
mathematical model to detect and remove compromised nodes, thus prolonging the system lifetime. A compromised node
can share information with other nodes including both outside attackers and inside attackers to more easily compromise
other nodes. We model the attacker strength being proportional to the degree of compromised nodes in the system, which
can be estimated by our mathematical model. The increase in attacker strength is countered by increasing the IDS detection
rate proportional to the number of compromised nodes detected by IDS. When more than 1/3 of the group members have
been compromised, a security failure occurs due to Condition C2. This is also countered in our system by invoking IDS to
detect and remove compromised nodes.
5. Performance model
We develop a mathematical model based on SPN as shown in Fig. 2 to describe the behaviors of a GCS instrumented
with IDS to deal with insider attacks and region-based group key management to deal with outsider attacks in MANETs.
The purpose of developing the model is to identify optimal settings to maximize MTTSF while satisfying the performance
requirement in terms of ˆ Ctotal. The SPN model is constructed as follows:
The SPN model describes the behavior of a mobile group as it evolves. It suffices to model the behavior of a single mobile
group as the GCS fails when a single group fails for mission-critical applications. A mobile group may be partitioned into
two and may merge with another group during its lifetime. We track trusted members, compromised members undetected,
and compromised members detected during its lifetime to understand its security and performance characteristics.
We use places to classify nodes except for place NG which holds the current number of groups in the system. Specifically,
place Tm holds trusted members, UCm holds compromised nodes not yet detected by IDS, and DCm holds compromised
nodes that have been detected by IDS. Note that Tm, UCm, and DCm represent nodes in one group, not in the system. Thus,
the numbers of nodes in places Tm, UCm, and DCm, obtained by mark(Tm),mark(UCm), and mark(DCm), respectively, would
be adjusted based on the number of groups existing in the system (obtained by mark(NG)), which changes upon group
merge/partition events.
We use transitions to model events. The event occurrence times are either deterministic or exponentially distributed
in our model. Specifically, T_FA models a node being falsely identified as compromised. T_IDS models a compromised
node being detected. The event occurrence times to T_FA and T_IDS are fixed periodic times due to the use of the base
periodic detection interval TIDS. T_CP models a node being compromised. In the reliability community, it is well accepted
that the software/hardware failure time follows exponential distribution. Therefore, it is justified to assume that the
event occurrence time of T_CP is exponentially distributed. T_MER and T_PAR model the group merge or partition event,
respectively. We model group merge and partition events by a birth–death process (a Markov model) as shown in Fig. 3 so
the time it takes for a group partition or merge event to occur, in T_MER or T_PAR, is inherently exponentially distributed.
We have used deterministic distribution for T_RK for modeling the rekeying time in the analysis. T_DRQ models a data
leak security failure (Condition C1). The assumption that packet arrivals follow a Poisson distribution is well accepted in
the networking community and has been used in many previous studies. Therefore, it is justified to assume that the event
occurrence time of T_DRQ is exponentially distributed.
A firing of a transition will change the state of the system, which is represented by the distribution of tokens in the SPN.
For example, mark(NG) changes upon firing T_MER or T_PAR since the number of groups is changed upon a group merge
or partition event; the number of compromised nodes undetected is incremented by 1 and, thus, place UCm will hold one
more token when T_CP fires. A transition is eligible to fire when the firing conditions associated with the event are met. ThisAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 3. A birth–death process for group merging/partitioning events.
is presented by (1) its input place must contain at least one token and (2) the associated enabling guard function, if exists,
must return true. For example, T_CP is enabled to fire when there are ‘‘good’’ nodes in the group, that is, place Tm holds at
least one token, and the enabling function associated with T_CP returns true.
Except for tokens contained in place NG, we use a ‘‘token’’ in the SPN model to represent a node in the group. The
population of each type of nodes is equal to the number of tokens in the corresponding place. Initially, all N members
are trusted in one group and put in place Tm as tokens.
Trusted members may become compromised because of insider attacks with a node-compromising rate A(mc). This is
modeled by firing transition T_CP and moving tokens one at a time (if it exists) from place Tm to place UCm. Tokens in place
UCm representcompromisedbutundetectedmembernodes.Weconsiderthesystemashavingexperiencedasecurityfailure
when data are leaked out to compromised but undetected members, i.e., Condition C1. A compromised but undetected
memberwillattempttocompromisedatafromothermembersinthegroup.ThisismodeledbyassociatingtransitionT_DRQ
with rate λq ∗ mark(UCm). Firing transition T_DRQ will move a token into place GF, at which point we regard the system as
having experienced a security failure due to Condition C1.
AcompromisednodeinplaceUCm maybedetectedbyIDSbeforeitcompromisesdataintheGCS.Theintrusiondetection
activity of the system is modeled by the detection function with rate D(md). Whether the damage has been done by a
compromisednodebeforethecompromisednodeisdetecteddependsontherelativemagnitudeofthenode-compromising
rate (A(mc)) versus the IDS detection rate (D(md)). When transition T_IDS fires, a token in place UCm will be moved to
place DCm, meaning that a compromised, undetected node now becomes detected by IDS. For region-voting-based IDS,
the transition rate of T_IDS is mark(UCm) ∗ D(md) ∗ (1 − Pfn), taking into consideration the false negative probability
of region-voting-based IDS used. Region-voting-based IDS can also false-positively identify a trusted member node as
compromised. This is modeled by moving a trusted member in place Tm to place DCm after transition T_FA fires with rate
mark(Tm) ∗ D(md) ∗ Pfp. Note that region-voting-based IDS parameters, Pfn and Pfp, can be derived based on p1 and p2, the
number of vote-participants (m), and the current number of compromised nodes which may collude to disrupt the service
of the system. Later we will show how we may parameterize Pfn and Pfp.
Finally, the group is considered as experiencing a security failure if either one of the two security failure conditions,
Condition C1 or Condition C2, is met. This is modeled by making the group enter an absorbing state when either Condition
C1orConditionC2istrue.IntheSPNmodel,thisisachievedbyassociatingeverytransitionintheSPNmodelwithanenabling
function that returns false (thus disabling the transition from firing) when either Condition C1 or Condition C2 is met, and
returnstrueotherwise.FortheSPNmodel,ConditionC1istruewhenmark(GF) > 0representingthatdatahavebeenleaked
out to compromised, undetected members; Condition C2 is true when more than 1/3 of member nodes are compromised
but undetected as indicated in Eq. (3) below, where mark (UCm) returns the number of compromised but undetected nodes
in the group and mark(Tm) returns the number of trusted healthy nodes in the group.
mark(UCm)
mark(Tm) + mark(UCm)
>
1
3
. (3)
5.1. Group merge and partition
We model group merge and partition events by a birth–death process as shown in Fig. 3. When the system has i groups,
i.e., in state i, the group partitioning rate is λnp,i and the group merging rate is µnm,i. We parameterize merging/partitioning
rates by means of simulation. We first observe the number of merge and partition events by simulation for a sufficiently
long period of time T. We next observe the sojourn time Si when the system stays in state i, i.e., when i groups are present
in the system. Let Nnm,i and Nnp,i be the numbers of group merge and partition events observed in state i, respectively. Then,
by first order approximation the merging/partitioning rates in state i, represented by µnm,i and λnp,i, may be estimated by:
µnm,i =
Nnm,i
Si
λnp,i =
Nnp,i
Si
. (4)
Note that the merging/partitioning rates parameterized in Eq. (4) are a function of the node mobility and density in
general. We observe that when node density is high, group merge is more likely to occur than group partition, thus leadingAuthor's personal copy
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to a smaller number of groups observed in the system. On the other hand, as the node density is low, the system is more
likely to stay in a state in which there is a large number of groups. In other words, when the node density is low, group
partitioning is more likely to occur than group merging.
5.2. Calculation of security and performance metrics
We calculate MTTSF using the concept of mean time to absorption in the SPN model. Specifically, we use a reward
assignment such that a reward of 1 is assigned to all states except absorbing states which is modeled based on the two
security failure conditions (i.e., if either Condition C1 or Condition C2 is met, the system fails). By this reward assignment, a
reward of 1 (time unit) is cumulatively added to the system lifetime with every time unit elapsed until the system fails.
We calculate ˆ Ctotal by the probability-weighted average of ˆ Ctotal,i representing the communication cost incurred per time
unit (s) in state i. Specifically, ˆ Ctotal is calculated by accumulating ˆ Ctotal,i(t) over MTTSF divided by MTTSF, i.e.,
ˆ Ctotal =
 MTTSF
0 ˆ Ctotal,i(t)dt
MTTSF
. (5)
ˆ Ctotal,i is calculated as:
ˆ Ctotal,i = ˆ CGC, i + ˆ Cstatus,i + ˆ Crekey,i + ˆ CIDS, i + ˆ Cbeacon,i + ˆ Cmp, i + ˆ Cmobility,i (6)
where ˆ CGC,i, ˆ Cstatus,i, ˆ Crekey,i, ˆ CIDS,i, ˆ Cbeacon,i, ˆ Cmp,i, and ˆ Cmobility,i are the cost components for group communication, status
exchange, rekeying, intrusion detection, beacon, group partition/merge, and mobility events, respectively, given that the
number of groups in the system is i. The calculation of ˆ Cbeacon,i, ˆ Cmp,i, and ˆ Cmobility,i follows that in [2]. Below we explain how
we calculate ˆ CGC,i, ˆ Cstatus,i, ˆ Crekey,i, ˆ CIDS,i based on the SPN model.
ˆ CGC,i: this cost includes the communication cost incurred by group communication activities. It is calculated by:
ˆ CGC,i = λq × N × (bGC/e) × [Nregion,i × Hregion × Hleader,i] (7)
where λq is the group communication rate, N is the number of active group members in the single group observed (i.e.,
mark(UCm) + mark(Tm)), bGC is the message size (bits) of a group communication packet, e is the channel error probability
and thus bGC/e is the total number of bits transmitted before the packet is received, Nregion,i is the number of regions in a
group where there are i groups, Hregion is the number of hops multicast from a leader to all regional members, and Hleader,i is
the number of hops multicast from one leader to all other leaders in a group where there are i groups. The number of hops
in Hregion is counted based on the use of a binary tree for a multicasting message. Here Aregion is the area of a region, s is the
circum-radius of a hexagon-shaped region, R is the wireless per-hop radio range (m), and i is the number of groups observed
in the system and R (n) returns the number of regions in the entire system. When there are i groups in the system, the radius
of a group can be approximated as r/
√
i where r is the radius of the operational area. Hleader,i returns 0 when i = 1 as a
special case. Hregion,Hleader,i, and Nregion,i are calculated as follows:
Hregion =
s
R
× (N
members
region − 1) where s =

2
3
√
3
Aregion Aregion =
A
R(n)
(8)
Hleader,i =
r
R
√
i
× (Nregion,i − 1) (9)
Nregion,i =
R(n)
i
. (10)
ˆ Cstatus,i: this cost is for group node status exchange for intrusion detection. It is calculated by:
ˆ Cstatus,i =
(N × (bs/e)) × [Nregion,i × Hregion + Hleader,i]
Tstatus
(11)
where Tstatus is the periodic time interval for disseminating a status exchange message, N is the number of group members,
and bs is the message size (bits) of the status exchange information.
ˆ Crekey,i: this cost is for group key rekeying due to join/leave events and forced evictions to evict detected compromised
nodes. It is calculated as:
ˆ Crekey,i = ˆ Cjoin/leave,i + ˆ Ceviction,i (12)
where ˆ Cjoin/leave,i is the cost introduced by leave and join operations per time unit and ˆ Ceviction,i is the cost introduced by
forced evictions per time unit. ˆ Cjoin/leave,i is as calculated in [2] and is not repeated here. ˆ Ceviction,i is calculated by:
ˆ Ceviction,i = [rate(T_IDS) + rate(T_FA)] × ˆ Cleave,i. (13)Author's personal copy
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Here rate(T_IDS) gives the intrusion detection rate and rate(T_FA) gives the false alarm rate which detects trusted nodes as
compromised nodes. Both can be obtained easily from the SPN model. ˆ Cleave,i is the cost per leave operation when there are
i groups in the system, as calculated in [2].
ˆ CIDS,i: this is the communication cost due to IDS. For region-voting-based IDS, this cost is computed as:
ˆ CIDS, i = D(md) × (1 − Pfn) × N × [bm−list + m × bv]/e × [H
uni
leader,i + Hregion ×Nregion,i] (14)
where D(md) is the detection rate proportional to the number of compromised nodes detected by IDS to counter increasing
attacker strength, Pfn is the probability of false negatives, N is the number of current members in a group, m is the number
of vote-participants against a target node, bm−list is the message size (bits) of the list containing m vote participants, bv is the
message size (bits) of a vote, and H
uni
leader,i is the number of hops between two leaders calculated as r/R
√
i.
6. Numerical results and analysis
In this section, we present numerical data for MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal obtained when given a set of parameter values character-
izing the operational and environmental conditions and show that there exist optimal design settings in terms of the IDS
detection interval and the regional area size under which MTTSF is maximized while ˆ Ctotal is minimized for a GCS in MANET
environments. We first parameterize (i.e., give values to) key model parameters reflecting the operating conditions of the
GCS and then we present numerical results and analysis with physical interpretations given.
6.1. Parameterization
Below we describe how to assign proper values to several key model parameters to reflect the operational and environ-
mental conditions of the system.
N: This is the number of current active group members in the system. This number evolves dynamically as the system
evicts compromised nodes. Since a node leaves the group voluntarily with rate µ and joins the group with rate λ, the
probability that a node is active in the group is λ/(λ + µ) and the probability that it is not is µ/(λ + µ). Let Ntotal be
the total group population at any time. Then, N = Ntotalλ/(λ + µ). In the SPN model, we initially place (Ninit/mark(NG)) ×
(λ/(λ + µ)) tokens in place Tm, as the initial population of a mobile group. As the system evolves, N is obtained with
mark(Tm) + mark(UCm) indicating the number of current active members in a group.
Tcm: This is the communication time required for disseminating a rekeying message. The reciprocal of Tcm is the rate of
transition T_RK. As we use GDH for rekeying, Tcm can be calculated by Cleave,i divided by BW, the wireless network bandwidth
(Mbps) in the MANET.
A(mc): This is the attacker function that returns the rate at which a node is compromised in the system. It is also
the rate of transition T_CP. Specifically, A(mc) = λc × mc where λc is the base compromising rate and mc represents
the degree of compromised nodes currently in the system, defined by the ratio of N to the number of good nodes, i.e.,
mc = (mark(UCm) + mark(Tm))/mark(Tm). The base compromising rate (λc) can be obtained by first-order approximation
from observing the number of compromised nodes over a time period.
D(md): This is the detection function [41] that returns the rate at which intrusion detection is invoked, adjusted based
on the accumulated number of nodes that have been detected by IDS. It is also the transition rate of T_IDS in our SPN model.
Specifically, D(md) = md/TIDS, where TIDS is the base intrusion detection interval and md represents the degree of nodes that
have been detected by IDS, defined by the ratio of Ninit to N, i.e., md = Ninit/(mark(UCm) + mark(Tm)). The base intrusion
detection interval TIDS is a design parameter to be adjusted to maximize MTTSF while minimizing ˆ Ctotal.
Pfn & Pfp: Pfn is the probability of false negatives and Pfp is the probability of false positives based on vote-based IDS. We
parameterize them by:
Pfp or Pfn =
m−Nmajority −
i=0

 

C

Nbad
Nmajority + i

× C

Ngood
m −

Nmajority + i


C

Ngood + Nbad
m


 

+
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i=0

 
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
C

Nbad
i

×
m−i ∑
j=Nmajority−i
[
C

Ngood
j

× pj × C

Ngood − j
m − i − j

× (1 − p)(m−i−j)
]
C

Ngood + Nbad
m


 


. (15)
Here p corresponds to p1 or p2 for false negative or false positive probability for Pfn or Pfp. In region-voting-based IDS,
Ngood = mark(Tm)/Nregion,i and Nbad = mark(UCm)/Nregion,i. Basically, Pfn is calculated by the number of compromised
nodes incorrectly diagnosed as trusted healthy nodes (i.e., detecting a bad node as a good node) over the number of detected
nodes. On the other hand, Pfp is calculated by the number of normal nodes incorrectly flagged as anomalies over the numberAuthor's personal copy
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Table 2
Main parameters and default values.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
λ 1/(60∗60) σ 1/(60∗60∗32) TRB 5 s
µ 1/(60∗60∗4) BW 1 Mbps TLB 2 s
TIDS 5–1200 s Ninit 150 nodes m 3
Tstatus 300 s D(md)/A(mc) Linear R 200 m
λc 1/(60∗60∗24) r 500 m bvote 100 bits
λq 1/30 bGDH 64 bits bm−list 100 bits
p1 2% bGC 800 bits e 0.5
p2 2% bs 400 bits
Fig. 4. MTTSF versus TIDS with p1 = p2 = 0.005.
of detected normal nodes. We consider intrinsic defect of host-based IDS in each node as well as collusion of compromised
nodes in region-voting-based IDS, so a compromised participant can cast a negative vote against a healthy target node and
can cast a positive vote for a malicious node.
6.2. Data and analysis
We vary values of key design parameters to analyze their effects on optimal settings (in terms of the best regional size
and the best IDS interval) under which the system performance is optimized. Table 2 summarizes default parameter values.
We test the effects of key parameters such as per-node false negative or false positive probabilities (p1, p2), the group
communication rate (λq) and the compromising rate (λc). Note that for region-voting-based IDS, Pfn and Pfp are calculated
based on Eq. (15).
Figs. 4 and 5 analyze the optimal settings in terms of the IDS detection interval TIDS and the number of regions Nregion
under which MTTSF is maximized. Fig. 4 is for the case of low p1 and p2 values while Fig. 5 is for the case of high p1 and p2
values. The special case in which there is only one region (Nregion = 1) is also considered.
From Figs. 4 and 5, we observe that there exists an optimal TIDS that maximizes MTTSF. In general, as TIDS increases,
MTTSF increases until its optimal TIDS is reached, and then MTTSF decreases past the optimal TIDS. The reason of decreasing
MTTSF after reaching the optimal point is that the false positive probability (Pfp) increases as TIDS decreases, therefore
resulting in more nodes being falsely identified as compromised and being evicted from the system. Here we note that
decreasing TIDS (thus performing IDS more often) in effect increases the number of good nodes being misdiagnosed as bad
nodes over time, thereby decreasing the number of good nodes (Ngood) and adversely affecting the false positive probability
computed by Eq. (15). Next, we observe that there exists an optimal regional area size which is largely dictated by p1
and p2 values. Note that Pfp is one aspect of false alarms generated by IDS, which increases if IDS is more frequently
triggered. When p1 = p2 is sufficiently low (i.e., p1 = p2 = 0.005) as shown in Fig. 4, the best MTTSF is found with
Nregion = 1 at TIDS = 30 s. When p1 = p2 is sufficiently high (i.e., p1 = p2 = 0.02) as shown in Fig. 5, the best MTTSF is
identified with Nregion = 19 at TIDS = 120 s. The optimal MTTSF exists due to the tradeoff between the positive and adverse
effects of performing IDS.
Specifically, when p1 = p2 is sufficiently low, Pfp and Pfn are also sufficiently low due to the positive effect of high quality
IDS, so the system benefits the best by using m vote-participants out of a large region, i.e., at Nregion = 1. On the other hand,
when p1 = p2 is high, Pfp and Pfn are also sufficiently high due to the adverse effect of IDS, so the system benefits the best
by using m vote-participants out of a moderately large region at Nregion = 19 such that it still has a good chance of finding
m vote-participants in the region without suffering too much from high Pfp and Pfn.Author's personal copy
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Fig. 5. MTTSF versus TIDS with p1 = p2 = 0.02.
(a) ˆ Ctotal versus TIDS with p1 = p2 = 0.02. (b) ˆ Ctotal versus Nregion with p1 = p2 = 0.02.
Fig. 6. ˆ Ctotal with respect to TIDS and Nregion with p1 = p2 = 0.02.
Lastly, we notice that as p1 = p2 increases, the optimal TIDS increases. This is again due to the tradeoff between the
positive and adverse effects of IDS. When high p1 = p2 is used, triggering IDS less frequently will generate less false alarms.
On the other hand, when sufficiently low p1 = p2 is used, triggering of IDS often will improve MTTSF with the high quality
IDS without generating frequent false alarms. We notice that at Nregion = 61 MTTSF is low and flat because of the very low
probability of finding m vote-participants in a small region, resulting in IDS not being used much in the system.
Next we analyze the optimal settings in terms of TIDS and Nregion under which ˆ Ctotal is minimized. Fig. 6(a) shows ˆ Ctotal
versus TIDS with varying Nregion while Fig. 6(b) shows ˆ Ctotal versus Nregion with varying TIDS. We observe that ˆ Ctotal varies
depending on Nregion and that there is an optimal TIDS under which ˆ Ctotal is maximized. Moreover, when TIDS is sufficiently
large, say TIDS > 30 s, the optimal Nregion is 19. When TIDS = 15 s or 30 s, the optimal Nregion is at 7. The reason is that when
TIDS issufficientlysmall,thenodedensitytendstodecreaserapidlybecauseoffrequentintrusiondetectionactivitiestoevict
compromised nodes. In this case, the system tends to favor a small number of regions (represented by Nregion = 7) to reduce
the inter-regional overhead, as in this case the inter-regional overhead will dominate the intra-regional overhead since the
intra-regionaloverheadwillberelativelysmallwhenthenodedensityislow.LastlywhenNregion > 37, ˆ Ctotal increasesagain
because the inter-regional communications cost outweighs the intra-regional communication cost. We also observe that in
Fig. 6(a) region-voting-based IDS with no region (i.e., Nregion = 1) at its optimal settings (TIDS = 5,Nregion = 1) performs the
best due to a significant reduction of active members because of high false positives generated by IDS.
Next we analyze the effect of p1 and p2 on the optimal settings that maximize MTTSF and minimize ˆ Ctotal. Figs. 7 and 8
summarize the results. Here for each MTTSF or ˆ Ctotal curve, TIDS is chosen at its optimal value to isolate out of its effect. As
shown in Fig. 7, when p1 = p2 is sufficiently low (0.005 or 0.007 or 0.01), MTTSF is the best at Nregion = 1. However, when
p1 = p2 becomes higher, say p1 = p2 > 0.01, we observe the best MTTSF at Nregion = 19. The results correlate well with
the results presented earlier in Figs. 4 and 5, so the same physical interpretation applies for the tradeoff between positiveAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 7. MTTSF versus p1 and p2 with varying Nregion.
Fig. 8. ˆ Ctotal versus p1 and p2 with varying Nregion.
and negative effects of IDS. In Fig. 8, we observe that when p1 = p2 is sufficiently low, ˆ Ctotal is minimized at Nregion = 19.
However, when p1 = p2 becomes higher, say p1 = p2 > 0.01, we observe that ˆ Ctotal is minimized at Nregion = 7 or
1. Again this result correlates well with those presented in Fig. 6. We note that there exists a tradeoff between security
versus performance. While MTTSF is maximized at Nregion = 19 when p1 = p2 is high (e.g., >0.01), ˆ Ctotal is minimized at
Nregion = 19onlywhenp1 = p2islow(e.g.,≤0.01).Consequently,thesystemdesignershouldselectthebestsettingsunder
which the system requirements on MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal are best satisfied.
Here we note that a major advantage gained from combining IDS with hierarchical key management is that intrusion
detection can directly leverage the region-based key management infrastructure to efficiently implement IDS functionality
with the region-voting-based IDS design. The case in which intrusion detection and key management are separately
managed can be represented by the special case in which there is no concept of region-based management, i.e., Nregion = 1
with the flat architecture. We see from Figs. 6–8 that our integrated region-based scheme at identifying optimal settings
can significantly outperform the no-region special case in the total network traffic incurred per time unit. For example, in
Fig. 6(a) when TIDS > 60 s, we see that the optimal setting is at Nregion = 19 for minimizing the overall traffic per time unit
under which our integrated region-based scheme significantly performs better the special case in which separate intrusion
detection and key management are being employed with Nregion = 1.
Finally, we analyze the effect of the group communication rate (λq) and compromising rate (λc) on MTTSF or ˆ Ctotal.
Table 3 summarizes the optimal Nregion value under which MTTSF is maximized and/or ˆ Ctotal is minimized. We fix all other
parameters at their default values. We observe that as λq increases, the optimal Nregion value increases, while the resulting
MTTSF decreases. The reason for a low MTTSF when λq is high is mostly due to security failure in Condition C1. We observe
that as λq increases, ˆ Ctotal increases because of the increased group communication cost.
For the effect of λc, we observe that as λc increases, the optimal Nregion value decreases while the resulting MTTSF
decreases. The reason is that with a high λc there are more compromised nodes in the system and the system will benefit
more from using a smaller Nregion to increase the probability of being able to find m vote-participants in order to moreAuthor's personal copy
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Table 3
Effect of λq and λc on optimal Nregion, MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal.
λq (Nregion,MTTSF) (Nregion, ˆ Ctotal) λc (Nregion,MTTSF) (Nregion, ˆ Ctotal)
Once per 15 s (19, 92459) (1, 216431) Once an hr (1, 9618) (19, 855480)
Once per 30 s (19, 96909) (1, 186933) Once per 12 h (1, 54515) (7, 326509)
Once per 1 min (19, 103919) (1, 172210) Once a day (19, 96909) (1, 186933)
Once per 5 min (1, 145390) (19, 83969) Once per 2 days (19, 184938) (1, 106724)
Once per 10 min (1, 177034) (19, 64544) Once per 4 days (19, 359233) (1, 64329)
Table 4
Optimal settings of region-based group key management integrated with voting-based IDS.
Optimal settings for maximizing
MTTSF
Optimal settings for minimizing ˆ Ctotal
Host-based IDS false negative/false positive
probabilities (p1/p2)
High Small regional area size
Large TIDS
Large regional area size
Large TIDS
Low Large regional area size Small regional area size
Small TIDS Small TIDS
Group communication rate (λq) High Small regional area size Large regional area size
Small TIDS Small TIDS
Low Large regional area size Small regional area size
Large TIDS Large TIDS
Compromising rate (λc) High Large regional area size Small regional area size
Small TIDS Small TIDS
Low Small regional area size Large regional area size
Large TIDS Large TIDS
effectively evict compromised nodes. We also observe that when λc increases, the optimal Nregion in minimizing ˆ Ctotal
increases while the resulting ˆ Ctotal increases slightly. The reason that ˆ Ctotal increases slightly as λc increases is that when
there are more compromised nodes in a group, IDS is triggered more frequently, thus increasing the overall cost. The
reason that the optimal Nregion value increases whenλc increases is that the inter-regional communication overhead in ˆ CIDS,i
(disseminating a message from a member to a leader) is small compared with the intra-regional communication overhead
(disseminating a message from each leader to its regional members), so the system favors a large Nregion to reduce the
intra-regional overhead. Here again we see that a tradeoff exists between security versus performance. The system designer
should select the best Nregion such that both the security requirement (in terms of MTTSF) and performance requirement (in
terms of ˆ Ctotal) can be best satisfied.
Table 4 summarizes optimal settings of our proposed integrated hierarchical group key management protocol integrated
with region-voting-based IDS, under which MTTSF is maximized and/or ˆ Ctotal is minimized. This provides guidelines for
system designers to fine-tune the regional area size and the IDS detection interval to best satisfy application-imposed
security and performance requirements. The general trend is that when (p1, p2), λq or λc is low, low MTTSF and high ˆ Ctotal
areobserved,andviceversa.ForMTTSF,theoptimalregionalareasizeandtheoptimalintrusiondetectionintervalidentified
are dictated by the tradeoff between positive effects of IDS (e.g., removing compromised nodes as soon as possible not to be
vulnerable to them) and negative effects of IDS (e.g., false positives and negatives generated by triggering IDS). For ˆ Ctotal, the
optimalregionalareasizeisprimarilydeterminedbythetradeoffbetweeninter-regionalandintra-regionalcommunication
overheadswhiletheoptimalintrusiondetectionintervalisdictatedbythetradeoffbetweenIDSrelatedcommunicationcost
and group communication cost.
6.3. Comparative analysis
In this section, we perform a comparative analysis of regional-based integrated management against two baseline
schemes: (a) a separate management scheme in which intrusion detection and group key management are being employed
separately, with m = 3 nodes being selected for performing voting-based IDS functions, and (b) a separate management
schemeinwhichintrusiondetectionandkeymanagementarebeingemployedseparately,withonlyonenodebeingselected
for IDS functions, i.e., without voting-based IDS.
Figs. 9 and 10 compare MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal obtained for these three schemes as a function of the host-based IDS false
negative/false positive probabilities (p1/p2), with TIDS fixed at its optimal value under which the MTTSF of the integrated
management scheme is maximized. As shown in Fig. 9, region-based integrated management has the best MTTSF among all.
Furthermore,thedifferenceinMTTSF ismoresignificantasthehost-basedIDSfalseprobabilityincreases.Ontheotherhand,
separate management without voting-based IDS performs significantly worse than others due to the fact that it relies on
only a single evaluator to make diagnosis decisions. From Fig. 10, we observe that the MTTSF advantage gained by integratedAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 9. MTTSF of integrated management versus separate management schemes.
Fig. 10. ˆ Ctotal of integrated management versus separate management schemes.
management over separate management does not come with the penalty of increased control message traffic, because
integrated management can directly leverage the region-based hierarchical infrastructure to efficiently implement both
key management and IDS functions. Together with Figs. 9 and 10, we conclude that integrated management yields higher
MTTSF while producing lower control message traffic compared with separate deployment of key management and IDS
techniques.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed and analyzed region-based hierarchical group key management integrated with voting-based
IDStodealwithbothoutsiderandinsidersecurityattacksforaGCSinMANETsforefficiency,scalabilityandsurvivability.Our
resultsshowedthatthereexistoptimalsettingsintermsoftheoptimalregionalareasizeandIDSintrusiondetectioninterval
to maximize the mean time to security failure while minimizing the total communication cost of the GCS. Furthermore, we
showedthatourproposedregion-basedintegratedschemeoutperformsexistingschemesforwhichintrusiondetectionand
group key management are being employed separately. The tradeoff between security and performance can be summarized
by a system designer into a lookup table listing optimal settings. Then at runtime for a given set of parameter values
characterizing the operational and environmental conditions of MANETs observed dynamically, the GCS can perform a table
lookup operation to select optimal settings for maximizing the mean time to security failure (representing the lifetime of the
GCS) while minimizing the total communication cost.Author's personal copy
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In the future, we plan to investigate if trust-based IDS techniques can be applied to better cope with collusion of
compromised nodes. Also in this paper, we considered the use of PKI with preloaded public keys of all group members
for source authenticity in the bootstrapping period. As future work, we plan to investigate the use of dynamic public key
management and trust-based management for source authenticity.
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